

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN IMO STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2019

Prof. Nwachukwu Obiakor
Department of History and International Studies
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka
+234 803 746 5603
&
Achonwa Walter Ebuka
Department of History and International Studies
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka
achonwawalter79@gmail.com
+2348039631979

Abstract

Democratic consolidation requires institutionalised political parties that aggregate interests, facilitate peaceful competition, and accept electoral outcomes. Drawing on Structural Functionalism Theory, which views the political system as a set of interrelated structures whose proper functioning is essential for systemic stability and continuity, this study examines the role of political parties in Imo State, Nigeria, during the Fourth Republic (1999–2019). From a structural-functional perspective, political parties are expected to perform critical functions, including interest aggregation, elite recruitment, political socialisation, and the peaceful management of political competition. However, in Imo State, these functions were largely unfulfilled. Despite intense multiparty competition, democratic consolidation remained elusive because political parties operated primarily as personalised vehicles of elite control rather than as programmatic organisations capable of sustaining democratic deepening. The central problem is that the failure of parties to perform their expected systemic functions generated dysfunctions that undermined democratic stability. Drawing on oral interviews with political actors, electoral records, contemporary accounts, and secondary analyses, the study demonstrates how flawed party primaries, elite factionalism, zonal politics, godfatherism, electoral violence, and weak institutional enforcement systematically distorted the functional roles of political parties. The findings reveal consistent patterns across successive administrations involving the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA), All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), and All Progressives Congress (APC), including the frequent imposition of candidates, mass defections, protracted litigation, and manipulation of electoral outcomes. Zonal bargaining and godfatherism further fragmented parties, while electoral violence and weak enforcement by electoral and judicial institutions eroded public trust and the legitimacy of successive governments. Collectively, these dynamics demonstrate that the mere existence of multiple political parties is insufficient for democratic consolidation when internal democracy is absent and parties remain instruments of personal and factional power, thereby failing to perform their essential systemic functions. The study recommends the strict enforcement of transparent and independent party primaries, the reduction of godfather influence through regulatory and party-financing reforms, the institutionalisation of predictable and inclusive zoning arrangements, the strengthening of INEC and judicial independence, and sustained civic education to promote programmatic politics. Such measures are essential for enabling political parties in Imo State and similar contexts to evolve into functional institutions capable of supporting genuine democratic consolidation.

Keywords: Political Parties, Democratic Consolidation, Electoral Violence, Godfatherism, Zoning, Imo State, Nigeria

Introduction

Political parties occupy a fundamental place in the gamut of democratic consolidation. As institutions that structure political competition, they are widely regarded as indispensable to the deepening and sustainability of democratic rule. According to J. S. Omotola, political parties are expected to perform a cluster of critical functions such as the political socialisation of the electorate, the recruitment and training of political leadership, the aggregation and articulation of societal interests, and the provision of a unifying force within deeply divided polities.¹ These roles are not merely instrumental, they constitute the institutional mechanisms through which democratic norms are internalised, political participation is channelled, and the rules of the game acquire legality. In post-military Nigeria, the return to civilian rule in May 1999 generated heightened expectations that political parties would anchor the democratic institutions of the Fourth Republic. After decades of authoritarian interruption and successive failed experiments with party politics, the return to multi-party competition was widely anticipated to foster the stabilisation of democratic practice. Yet, the subsequent trajectory of party politics has revealed persistent structural weaknesses such as, weak institutionalisation, limited ideological

coherence, elite capture, godfatherism, deficient internal democracy, and a predominance of clientelistic and personalistic networks. These characteristics have constrained political parties' capacity to perform the stabilising and legitimating functions associated with consolidated democracies, as conceptualised in the broader literature on democratic consolidation where democracy is seen as "the only game in town" and the institutionalisation of stable, rule-bound competition.²

Imo State, created in 1976 from the former East Central State under the military regime of General Murtala Muhammed with a recorded population of 3,934,899 in the 2006 census.³ Politically comprising of 27 local government areas, 305 electoral wards, 27 state constituencies, 10 federal constituencies, and 3 senatorial districts - Imo West(Orlu), Imo East(Owerri), and Imo North(Okigwe).⁴ frequently described as the "Eastern Heartland," furnishes a revealing subnational microcosm of these national dynamics. Situated within the Igbo political and cultural heartland of the South-East, the state has experienced successive and often abrupt transitions among the People's Democratic Party (PDP), Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA), All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), and All Progressives Congress (APC) between 1999 and 2019. While these shifts produced formal alternation in power amongst Achike Udenwa (PDP, 1999–2007), Ikedi Ohakim (PPA/PDP, 2007–2011), Rochas Okorocha (APGA/APC, 2011–2019), they were repeatedly marked by intra-party imposition of candidates, inter-party violence, opportunistic elite realignments and defections, and intensive judicial contestation of electoral results. The highly controversial 2019 governorship election and its subsequent Supreme Court resolution exemplify the extent to which electoral results and the transfer of power have remained contingent and contested rather than routinely accepted.

This article analyses the relationship between political parties and democratic consolidation in Imo State across the two decades following the return to civilian rule. It argues that while parties supplied the formal framework for electoral competition and the periodic transfer of executive power, their internal organisational practices and external modes of interaction systematically eroded the core conditions necessary for consolidation such as, the stabilisation of democratic rules, the generalised acceptance of electoral outcomes, and the progressive institutionalisation of power at the expense of personalised and clientelistic control. By examining the Imo experience as a concentrated expression of broader Nigerian patterns of party weakness, the study contributes to understanding why the formal existence of multiparty competition has not translated into deeper democratic consolidation at the subnational level.

Theoretical Framework

Structural functionalism, developed in the works of Émile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert K. Merton. The theory was initiated by natural scientists in their attempt to explain the working of organisms.⁵ However, it views society as a complex system whose interdependent parts (structures) perform specific functions that contribute to the maintenance of social order and equilibrium.⁶ In the political subsystem, structures such as political parties are expected to perform latent and manifest functions—including interest aggregation, political recruitment, socialization, communication, and the peaceful regulation of conflict—that sustain the broader democratic system.⁷

This theory, explains why formal multi-party competition in Imo State did not translate into deeper democratic consolidation. The system possessed the necessary structures, yet those structures failed to perform the input functions required for system maintenance and adaptation under democratic rules. The consequence was a persistent gap between the formal architecture of competition and the substantive conditions of consolidation such as, unstable rules, contested outcomes, and the continued personalisation of power.

Conceptual Clarifications

Political Parties

According to G Sartori, a political party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for public office.⁸ To Ndoh, political parties are an organised group of people that seek to control the machinery of government.⁹ A. Ikelegbe, on his part, avers that, political parties are much more than an organisation for expressing and harmonising interests, it is meant to intermediate between the citizens and political society, government and state.¹⁰ Suffice it to state that, political parties aside being an assemblage of people who share in the same policy vision and direction, is involved in the recruitment of the leadership process in a democratic space. Thus, political parties in this research, are seen as legal vehicles that drive democracy to either ruination or consolidation.

Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation according to A. Thompson, is an attempt to ensure that the democratic process endures beyond the first multi-party elections with a favourable political culture, strong civil society and a supportive economy.¹¹ To J. Linz, democratic consolidation is one in which none of the major political actors, parties or organised interests, forces or institutions considers that there is any alternative to the democratic

process to gain power and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the actions of democratically elected decision makers.¹²

In furtherance, L. Diamond, in his own view, posits that, democratic consolidation means the quality, depth, and authenticity of democracy in its various and varying dimensions which has been improved. To him, this, can only be, when political competition becomes fairer, freer; more vigorous and executive participation and representation broader; more autonomous and inclusive; civil liberties more comprehensive and rigorously protected; accountability more systematic and transparent.¹³

In other words, democratic consolidation in this research, refers not just to a situation in which democracy is seen but unanimously adopted as the only option.

Party Politics and its Challenges, 1999–2007

The transition opened with local government elections in December 5, 1998 in which the People's Democratic Party (PDP) defeated the All People's Party (APP), opening the flood gates of political cross carpeting of political heavyweights like Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, Evan Enwerem, Ifeanyi Ararume, Sam Mbakwe, Arthur Nzeribe et al from the APP to the PDP.¹⁴ which according to Chilos Godsent, is an early sign of opportunistic politics of the stomach.¹⁵ The gubernatorial primaries that followed, revealed early patterns of elite imposition. Within the PDP, intense contestation among aspirants including Rochas Okorocha, Greg Mbadiwe and Humphrey Anumudu culminated in the selection of Achike Udenwe who was relatively unknown as the consensus candidate through the influence of the troika of Chief Innocent Nwoga, Late Senator Emeka Echeruo and Engineer Charlse Ugwu who were the party power brokers.¹⁶ which Igboayaka O. Igboayaka attributed to the orchestration of a cabal who would want somebody that will be loyal to them above the masses.¹⁷

Although, Ike C. Ibe had argued that, there is nothing consensus in the selection and nomination of Udenwa as one of the aspirants went to court seeking to nullify the selection of Udenwa on that premise but, when he lost, he returned back to the party to support Udenwa and the PDP.¹⁸ The January 1999 election, which was fiercely contested was narrowly won by Chief Achike Udenwa of the PDP who polled 388,680 to defeat his rival, Engineer Ezekiel Izuogu of the APP who polled 379,491 in an election with a total number of 1,627,939 registered voters.¹⁹ To Ifeanyi Olumba, the election which was marked by limited violence, was won by the PDP largely on the strength of superior grassroots mobilisation and organization.²⁰

The 2003 election cycle was more or less, a rehash of the undemocratic tendencies of the 1998 primaries. While there was no primary elections in the PDP because the incumbent Governor was given the "right of first refusal" otherwise called automatic ticket shutting out other aspirants. The primary of the APP which transmuted to the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) was trailed by controversies as it was alleged by some aspirants that the ticket was denied Emeka Nwajiuba who rightly won the primaries but was given to Humphrey Anumudu who came second.²¹ The electioneering was riddled with vicious violence. According to Polycarp Nnaji, who gave an account of the death of OGB, it began just before the PDP National Assembly primaries, where Chief Ogbonnaya Uche, Chief Francis Arthur Nzeribe, Chief Douglas Acholonu and Mrs. Catherine Acholonu were aspirants. Knowing fully well that OGB was the clear choice of the Orlu people against Arthur Nzeribe, who was Governor Udenwa's choice, Udenwa and the Secretary to the State Government (SSG) Nze Ignatius Umunna manipulated the primaries in favour of Arthur Nzeribe. And in the morning after the PDP primaries, the All Nigeria Peoples' Party (ANPP) approached OGB and agreement was reached to give him the ANPP ticket for Orlu senatorial Seat unopposed despite attempts to stop him from getting the ticket by Arthur Nzeribe and governor Achike Udenwa by allegedly paying Chief Edmund J.K. Onyewuchi, the ANPP chairman in the State 18 million naira bribe. Going further, Nnaji stated that on the 8th February 2003 assassins stormed OGB's residence and went straight to his room where they snuffed life out of him.²²

Furthermore, a Human Rights Watch publication provided a catalogue of political violence that pervaded the land during the electioneering. The report indicated widespread rigging and armed intimidation at polling booths. According to the report, on the evening of April 19 2003, in Amaimo, Ikeduru Local Government, Onyewuchi Iwuchukwu, an ANPP member, was shot in front of his family house by PDP supporters associated with the PDP's local government chairmanship candidate, Samuel Anyanwu, known as Samdaddy. He died on his way to the hospital and witnesses were able to identify several of the perpetrators by name including the man who fired the shot which killed him, alleged to be the younger brother of Samuel Anyanwu and also a PDP supporter. And a group of thugs led by a PDP supporter, Emmanuel Alaribe on same day attacked another ANPP agent, Anthony Akuneho koga, with machetes. Going further, the report stated that on April 13 2007, an ANPP agent reported that he was attacked and abducted by three people including Jude Akoronye (who was also named in the killing of Onyewuchi Iwuchukwu) and Emmanuel Alaribe (named in the attack on Anthony Koga) to the house of Samuel Anyanwu where he was tortured and later released. And another ANPP agent was briefly abducted the same day on the orders of the transition committee chairman, Charles Anukwa, after protesting that Anukwa accompanied by mobile police men took away ballot boxes from the votes collation

centre. On same day, the document reported that Tony Dimegwu, an ANPP State House of Assembly candidate for Ahiazu Mbaise, was seriously injured by PDP supporters. According to the report, Dimegwu had heard rumours that PDP agents were carrying marked ballots into his constituency; when he challenged them, he was severely beaten up by PDP thugs who were reportedly led by Chidi Ibe. After this incident, a rumor spread that Dimegwu had been shot. That evening, in reaction to this news, a group of ANPP and other opposition supporters went to the local government headquarters building and set it on fire.²³ Chief Achike Udenwa was eventually declared the winner of the election by the electoral umpire - the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

It is important to note that, aside the violence and monumental electoral irregularities in Imo State, some persons have argued that Imo politics between this period (1999-2007) was characterised by zonal patronage under Udenwa, with key appointments skewed toward Orlu zone. According to Ikenna Odife, the distribution of social and infrastructural amenities and appointments into the key and juicy public offices in the state were skewed in favour of Orlu zone (where the governor hailed from). For example, the Secretary to the State Government (SSG) Chief I.M.O. Umunna, the Chief of Staff Government House, Dr. Vincent Udokwu, as well as two successive Vice Chancellors of the Imo State University, Owerri (Professors Anthony Anwuka and Innocent Chuka Okonkwo) all hail from Orlu zone. Also, employment into administrative and junior cadres in civil service, government departments, parastatals, and institutions was in favour of Orlu zone.²⁴

This foregoing, further illustrated the personalized and regional character of party governance. And, these practices weakened the capacity of parties to serve as agents of inclusive representation and democratic consolidation during these period.

The 2007 Transition and its Challenges.

The 2007 succession struggle within the PDP between incumbent Udenwa's "Ono ngo ono"(Immovable, on ground) faction(because it has an assemblage of politicians based in the state) and Senator Ifeanyi Ararume's "Destiny Group" re-christened "Abuja based(because its patron and other leaders had one federal or state assignment or the other in Abuja) exposed the fragility of internal party rules. After a disputed primary and successive court interventions culminating in a Supreme Court affirmation of Ararume's candidacy on the 5th of April, 2007.²⁵ With the judicial victory secured by Ararume, according to Olumba, the PDP and particularly Olusegun Obasanjo who was the president of the country and National leader of the party(PDP) flew into the state and publicly disowned Ararume at Dan Anyiam Stadium, Owerri declaring that the party, would not support him.²⁶ The search for whom to support outside of the PDP by the Ono ngo ono caucus of the PDP led them to Chief Martin Agbaso of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) but, with the subsequent cancellation and rescheduling of the 14 April gubernatorial poll by the Resident Electoral Commissioner, Mr Austin N. Okojie over some incidences of violence which according to J. O. Odey, came as official results from the twenty-four of the twenty-seven local councils had been released with Chief Martins Agbaso of APGA maintaining a comfortable lead. The most astonishing and confounding aspect of the cancellation to the Imo electorate and election observers and monitors being that the State Assembly Election conducted simultaneously in the same ballot box was upheld.²⁷

Against the backdrop of the cancellation of the "first round" of elections and the subsequent zoning of support and by extension the gubernatorial seat to Okigwe zone, Chief Udenwa mobilised to support an American-based son of Okigwe Zone, Mr. Jude Nzeakor, to run on the platform of the Accord Party(AP) but Maurice Iwu who was the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), insisted on Ikedi Ohakim of the Progressive Peoples' Alliance (PPA) who hailed from same local government Isiala Mbano (in Okigwe Zone) with him and Olusegun Obasanjo in a bid to compensate Maurice Iwu gave them (Achike Udenwa and Maurice Iwu) a "marching order" to go and deliver Ikedi Ohakim of the PPA.²⁸ And, the eventual declaration of Ikedi Ohakim of the PPA as winner on 28 April, which generated widespread allegations of elite bargains, zonal patronage and result fabrication.

Ohakim's later defection from the PPA to the PDP in 2009, sparked media wars with former political associates, like the former Governor of Abia State, founder and Board of Trustee Chairman of the PPA, Chief Orji Uzor Kalu and Maximus Uba, and a climate of intimidation and politically colored kidnappings as catalogued by CLEEN Foundation including the alleged abduction of Dr. Vin Udokwu a former commissioner of Health and a cousin to his (Ohakim) estranged political godfather (Udenwa), the kidnap of the son of Marcellinus Nlemigbo the then Imo State Chairman of PDP among others²⁹ further eroded trust in party competition as a consolidating mechanism. Prolonged litigation lasting over three years reinforced the perception that electoral outcomes were negotiable rather than definitive.

Party Realignment, and its Challenges, 2011–2019

The process that threw up the three major gubernatorial candidates that subsequently contested the 2011 gubernatorial elections in Imo State could best be described as that of intimidation, defection, and horse trading. There were virtually no primaries in the All Progressives' Grand Alliance (APGA), Peoples' Democratic Party

(PDP) and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). The “primaries” of the Peoples’ Democratic Party was characterised by intimidation and imposition of candidates for all elective posts by the “New Face Organization” which was the personal internal political machinery of the incumbent governor, Ikedi Ohakim. The process leading to the gubernatorial primaries in the PDP particularly led Senator Ifeanyi Ararume, Rochas Okorocha and other PDP members to leave the party in search of gubernatorial tickets in other parties. According to Austin Onyeaso, Senator Ifeanyi Ararume went to the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and was able to get its ticket even without, a well organised primaries because of his huge financial war chest.³⁰ Onwuasoanya posits that Rochas Okorocha, a renowned philanthropist, found solace in the All Progressives’ Grand Alliance (APGA) after much politicking, alliances and horse trading with Martins Agbaso who had been the gubernatorial candidate, leader and financier of the party in the state agreed to step down and support him (Rochas). According to him, with the emergence of this trio, Ohakim (PDP), Ararume (ACN), and Rochas (APGA), a new energy was released into Imo politics.³¹

Campaigns were dominated by the contested “Imo State Charter of Equity” promoted by the incumbent Governor Ikedi Ohakim to foreclose the chances of Rochas Okorocha from Orlu zone that had had Achike Udenwa for eight years and to sway Owerri zone’s sentiments against Ararume from Okigwe zone but, who might attempt to go for eight straight years thereby prolonging the turn of Owerri zone to have a bite at the leadership at the Douglas House. This Charter of Equity, which according to Odife, was the brainchild of few politicians from each zone, notably Chief Arthur Nzeribe from Orlu, Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu from Owerri and Chief John Enyigasi from Okigwe, was a strategy that would guarantee the various zones a fair and equal access and share of political power.³² To Onwuasoanya it is an illegal document of convenience originally made to guarantee equal and fair access of all the zones to power.³³ But, to Olumba, it’s a slogan that negates genuine democracy which is a universal concept that is meaningless without free and fair election where the people can choose those who will govern them and dismiss those who had failed them regardless of where they come from.³⁴

According to a report, the governorship election was fraught with diverse electoral malpractices, ranging from ballot box snatching, ballot box stuffing, thuggery and outright voter disenfranchisement which the opposition parties blamed on the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party. The report was specific in stating that in the Owerri North Council Area, as at 6:20pm no election materials had been brought to over five polling centres in the Okigwe Road and Orji areas of the council; at Nguru centre in Aboh Mbaiese Council Area, men in Army uniform, wielding military rifles took away electoral materials in the area and in the same Aboh Mbaiese, Godfrey Dikeocha, a former Speaker of the State House of Assembly and aide to governor Ikedi Ohakim and one Ogunewe Princewill, a representative at Okeovoro Development Centre, allegedly stormed polling units with armed thugs, two of whom were identified as Udochukwu Onyekwere and Ekwueme Nweke. The polling booths raided were at Umunebie Ndigbu Uvuru, as at 6:10pm, there was no voting in the entire Ngor Okpola Council Area due to issues ranging from the absence of result sheets to the unavailability of other relevant documents for the elections, at Ezinihite Council Area, Chinemerem Madu, the PDP chairman of the area allegedly invaded polling Booth 004, Ward1, Amumara with thugs compelling voters to vote PDP and openly sharing money to people; in Oguta Local Government, it was a theatre of war as gunshots were heard from different areas especially in Izombe Community.³⁵ A militarised collation process, and an eventual supplementary poll produced an Okorocha victory.

Subsequent events such as, the unilateral dissolution of all the 27 elected local government Chairmen and 645 councillors in a maiden broadcast by the governor; the impeachment of Deputy Governor Jude Agbaso who was nominated by his elder brother, Martin Agbaso as part of the broader arrangement to cede the political platform (APGA) to Rochas, so as to consolidate power; Okorocha’s suspension from APGA and migration to the newly formed All Progressives Congress (APC), and prolonged intra-APC factional struggles over succession, illustrated the continued personalization of party structures.

The 2015 and 2019 election cycles repeated familiar patterns which includes, inconclusive declarations, supplementary elections, mass defections after the national presidential result, parallel claims of primary victories within the APC, and violence at the 2019 collation center. In 2019, the Returning Officer of the election, Professor Francis Otunta declared Emeka Ihedioha of the PDP who polled 273,404 votes as the winner of the election; Uche Nwosu of the AA came second with 190,364 votes; Ifeanyi Ararume of APGA came third with 114,676 votes; Hope Uzodinma of the APC came fourth with 96,458 votes; Ikedi Ohakim of the Accord Party came fifth with 6,846 votes et al. ³⁶ Rejection of the results by major contenders and subsequent litigation again demonstrated the absence of decisive acceptance of electoral outcome which is a core requirement of consolidation.

Conclusion

Between 1999 and 2019, political parties in Imo State provided the institutional scaffolding for multiparty competition but failed to perform the deeper functions required for democratic consolidation. Personalised control, zonal patronage, intra-party authoritarianism, and recurrent electoral malpractice prevented

political parties from becoming reliable mechanisms for interest aggregation, peaceful competition, and power alternation. Several recurring features of party politics systematically hindered democratic consolidation. Party primaries were frequently characterised by candidate imposition, parallel results, and judicialisation rather than transparent delegate voting. Parties also functioned primarily as vehicles for elite ambitions and zonal interests rather than as programmatic platforms, with the “Charter of Equity” and successive succession crises exemplifying this pattern. Electoral violence, intimidation, and manipulation of results remained persistent, reducing incentives for electoral losers to accept outcomes, while frequent defections and the absence of stable party identification undermined the development of enduring voter–party linkages. Furthermore, weak enforcement of electoral laws and party constitutions by INEC and the courts allowed elite bargains to override formal institutional rules.

These practices produced a form of “electoralism without consolidation”: regular elections were conducted, but the behavioural and attitudinal foundations necessary for democratic stability remained fragile. The Imo experience therefore underscores a broader lesson for Nigeria: formal multipartyism is a necessary but insufficient condition for democratic consolidation. For political parties to contribute meaningfully to democratic deepening, there is a need to strengthen internal party democracy, enforce electoral integrity, reduce elite capture and patronage, promote stable party identification, and ensure the effective and impartial enforcement of electoral laws and party constitutions. Addressing these institutional and behavioural deficiencies is essential for transforming political parties from instruments of personalised and factional power into functional democratic institutions capable of sustaining democratic consolidation in Imo State and Nigeria more broadly.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are advanced to ensure political parties become institutions that support genuine democratic consolidation rather than formal multi-partyism without consolidation:

1. A strict enforcement of transparent and independent party primaries which will put an end to candidate imposition, parallel primaries, and “automatic tickets.” Primaries should be independently conducted, verifiable, and insulated from incumbent and godfather control so that parties can perform elite recruitment and interest aggregation.
2. Reduction of godfather influence through regulatory and financing reforms by adopting party-finance rules, campaign-finance limits, and regulatory oversight to weaken personalized patronage networks that currently determine tickets, appointments, and succession.
3. Institutionalization of predictable and inclusive zoning arrangements which will replace the ad hoc, elite-brokered zonal bargains with formal, transparent, and inclusive zoning rules that will reduce succession crises and intra-party factionalism without substituting for free choice by voters.
4. Strengthening of INEC and judicial independence to ensure that electoral administration and the courts must enforce party constitutions and electoral law independently so that, results are accepted rather than endlessly litigated or bargained. Because, weak enforcement is treated as a central reason losers refuse to accept outcomes.
5. Sustained civic education to promote programmatic politics to shift voters and elite expectations away from clientelism, zonal entitlement, and personality, towards issue-based competition, so parties can develop stable linkages with the electorates.

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