COST OF GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN NIGERIA: CHALLENGES, IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS

Abstract

Nigeria presents one of the most striking paradoxes in contemporary political economy: a country richly endowed with human and natural resources, yet persistently confronted by mass poverty, infrastructural decay, insecurity and weak public institutions. At the centre of this paradox lie three interlocking problems: the high cost of governance, entrenched corruption, and the fragility of mechanisms of public accountability. This paper examines how the structure and financing of the Nigerian state, particularly its bloated political offices, duplicated agencies and discretionary spending, create fertile ground for corruption, and how weak accountability institutions allow such corruption to persist with relative impunity. Drawing on prebendal theory, the theory of the two publics, principal–agent theory and the collective action perspective on corruption, the study relies on qualitative documentary analysis of scholarly literature, official reports and anti-corruption data. It argues that the high cost of governance in Nigeria is not merely a fiscal problem but a political arrangement that sustains patronage, rewards rent-seeking and undermines development. The paper identifies the implications of this arrangement for economic growth, social trust, service delivery and democratic legitimacy, and concludes with prospects for reform, including structural rationalisation of government, strengthening of anti-corruption and audit institutions, fiscal transparency, judicial reform, civic engagement and ethical reorientation.